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Abstract. Subjective judgements from experts provide essential infor-
mation when assessing and modelling threats in respect to cyber-physical
systems. For example, the vulnerability of individual system components
can be described using multiple factors, such as complexity, technolog-
ical maturity, and the availability of tools to aid an attack. Such in-
formation is useful for determining attack risk, but much of it is chal-
lenging to acquire automatically and instead must be collected through
expert assessments. However, most experts inherently carry some degree
of uncertainty in their assessments. For example, it is impossible to be
certain precisely how many tools are available to aid an attack. Tradi-
tional methods of capturing subjective judgements through choices such
as high, medium or low do not enable experts to quantify their uncer-
tainty. However, it is important to measure the range of uncertainty sur-
rounding responses in order to appropriately inform system vulnerability
analysis. We use a recently introduced interval-valued response-format to
capture uncertainty in experts’ judgements and employ inferential sta-
tistical approaches to analyse the data. We identify key attributes that
contribute to hop vulnerability in cyber-systems and demonstrate the
value of capturing the uncertainty around these attributes. We find that
this uncertainty is not only predictive of uncertainty in the overall vul-
nerability of a given system component, but also significantly informs
ratings of overall component vulnerability itself. We propose that these
methods and associated insights can be employed in real world situations,
including vulnerability assessments of cyber-physical systems, which are
becoming increasingly complex and integrated into society, making them
particularly susceptible to uncertainty in assessment.
Keywords: cyber-security · uncertainty · interval-values · intervals
1 Introduction
Cyber-security professionals play a vital role in assessing and predicting vulner-
abilities within cyber-physical systems, which often form part of an organisa-
? Supported by EPSRCs EP/P011918/1 grant and by the UK National Cyber Security
Centre (NCSC).
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tion’s or state’s critical digital infrastructure. As outsider threats become more
prevalent and sophisticated, there is increasing pressure on experts to provide
timely and comprehensive assessments within the context of the rapidly chang-
ing cyber-physical ecosystem. As cyber-systems increase in both ubiquity and
complexity, methods to quantify and handle error in subjective measurements
from experts need to be developed [13]. It has been demonstrated across many
industry sectors that as complexity increases accurate risk assessment decreases
[10]. Enabling the effective reconstruction of overall assessments from component
and attribute ratings would streamline the process of updating overall system
vulnerability assessments, in line with shifts in this ecosystem.
Both objective and subjective measures of risk provide useful information to
aid decision making in vulnerability assessment [4,5]. Several different methods
can be used to assess vulnerability and risk in a cyber-security system, such as
vulnerability scanning tools [18] or the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [15], which gives qualitative severity ratings of low, medium, and high,
and CVSS Version 3, which extends the ratings to include none and critical [8].
However, when using CVSS, the necessary information to complete the calcu-
lation may be missing. Hubbard and Seiersen [11] argue that assessing risk in
terms of low, medium, and high ratings is highly subjective and open to error.
It is therefore suggested that cyber-security risk should be described quantita-
tively. This would help quantify what areas of risk are perceived as important to
cyber-security professionals and, from that, move towards how those risks might
correspond to the actually enacted attacks and their success or failure.
Assessment of risk or the likelihood of an attack are inherently uncertain [1,2].
Objective measures may carry uncertainty because the measures themselves are
imprecisely defined [2]. Subjective assessments (collected from experts) carry
uncertainty because, for example, the experts are not familiar with the particu-
lar technology, there is inherent uncertainty caused by insufficient detail in the
scenario, or due to individual personality [12,16,20].
Between-expert uncertainty is often modelled implicitly, for example, through
probability distributions [7] or uncertainty measures [5]. These methods model
the between-expert uncertainty, but they do not capture within-expert uncer-
tainty. Choi et al. [4] capture within-expert uncertainty by enabling experts to
express knowledge and uncertainty through terms such as very small, small and
large and using fuzzy sets to represent the uncertainty of these words. However,
this assumes that the experts share the same degree of uncertainty regarding
the meanings of these terms. After capturing uncertainty, it may be modelled
and handled through methods such as Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [6,9] or
fuzzy logic [4,14,19].
We propose explicitly capturing uncertainty in experts’ individual judge-
ments using an interval-valued response format, as previously introduced in [17].
Experts provide ratings along a continuous scale to quantify, for example, the
perceived difficulty of an attack on a component. Using an interval captures both
the experts’ rating (position on the axis) and the degree of uncertainty associated
with the response (width of the interval). Fig. 1 shows an example of a narrow
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0 20 40 60 80 100
very easy very hard
Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do this?
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100
very easy very hard
Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do this?
(b)
Fig. 1. Illustration of narrow (a) and wide (b) interval-valued responses capturing
different degrees of uncertainty.
rating (slightly uncertain) and a wide rating (highly uncertain). In this manner,
uncertainty is captured as an integral aspect of the judgement itself, through
a coherent and intuitive response-format. The novel output of this paper is to
show that an interval-valued response scale can be used to effectively capture
uncertainty in expert judgements, and that this can be used to better predict
both the magnitude and the uncertainty of risk in vulnerability assessments.
In this paper, we assess the importance of a variety of attributes in deter-
mining the overall vulnerability of components being attacked or evaded within
a cyber-system; these include maturity of the technology and the frequency that
a given attack is reported (the full set of attributes are listed in Tables 1 and 2).
We also capture the overall difficulty of attacking or evading each component.
Our core aim is to understand how the component attributes contribute to the
overall difficulty of an attack and, equally importantly, how uncertainty in com-
ponent attributes affects not only the uncertainty in the overall vulnerability of
a component, but also the overall difficulty itself. For example, experts might
perceive an attack as more difficult if there are fewer tools available to aid in
this effort. However, experts might also perceive an attack as more difficult if
they are uncertain about the availability of tools. From this, we can learn what
additional insight is gained by capturing uncertainty through interval-valued
responses. Specifically, we wish to answer
– how is overall vulnerability of a component affected
• by attribute ratings?
• by uncertainty around attribute ratings?
– how is uncertainty around overall vulnerability of a component affected
• by attribute ratings?
• by uncertainty around attribute ratings?
We find that although cyber-security experts only assessed attributes that were
previously deemed likely to be important to component vulnerability, only some
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of these attributes have a significant effect. Similarly, we discover that although
uncertainty around some attributes affects the uncertainty around the compo-
nent as a whole, this is not consistent for all attributes. We also find that the
uncertainty around some attribute ratings makes a significant contribution to
overall vulnerability ratings themselves.
2 Methods
2.1 Data Collection
The data was collected from experts in CESG (Communications-Electronics Se-
curity Group), which was the information security arm of GCHQ (Government
Communication Head Quarters) in the United Kingdom1. A total of 38 cyber-
security experts at CESG assessed a range of components that are commonly
encountered during a cyber-attack. They rated these on both overall difficulty
to either attack or evade, as appropriate, and on several attributes that might
affect this difficulty. Two types of components (also referred to as hops) were
assessed, those that require an attacker to attack the component (referred to as
attack) and those that require the attacker to bypass the component (referred to
as evade). Examples of the hops assessed include bypass gateway content checker
and overcome client lockdown, but any hop may be assessed using this method.
Tables 1 and 2 list the attack and evade attributes, respectively (variable
notations are also provided, which are used in the next section). Attack hops are
defined by seven attributes and evade hops by three attributes. In addition, both
are described by their overall difficulty. Our aim is to understand how the hop
attributes and the uncertainty around these attributes relate to the perceived
overall difficulty of attacking/evading the hop, and to the uncertainty around
this difficulty. Experts were asked to provide interval-valued ratings to enable
them to coherently express the uncertainty associated with their responses; these
ratings were provided on a scale from 0 to 100.
The cyber-security components chosen for this study are designed to be rep-
resentative of a mainstream government system, which would include assets at
Business Impact Level 3 (BIL3) – an intermediate category of impact [3]. CESG
describes such a system as typically including remote site and mobile working,
backed by core services and back-end office integrated systems, such as telemetry
devices and associated systems used by the emergency services. Compromising
assets at BIL3 might have large-scale negative effects, including but not limited
to: disruption to regional power supply, key local transport systems, emergency
or other important local services for up to 24 hours, local loss of telecoms, risk to
an individual’s safety, damage to intelligence operations, hindrance to low level
crime detection and prosecution, or financial loss to the UK government or a
leading financial company in the order of millions (GBP) [3].
1 CESG has since been replaced by the NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre).
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Table 1. Attributes used to describe attack hops, the question used in the study, and
the variable name used in the analysis.
var attribute description
c complexity How complex is the target component (e.g. in terms
of size of code, number of sub-components)?
t interaction How much does the target component process/interact
with any data input?
f frequency How often would you say this type of attack is reported
in the public domain?
a availability of tool How likely is it that there will be a publicly available
tool that could help with this attack?
d inherent difficulty How inherently difficult is this type of attack? (i.e. how
technically demanding would it be to do from scratch,
with no tools to help.)
r maturity How mature is this type of technology?
g going unnoticed How easy is it to carry this attack out without being
noticed?
o overall difficulty Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do
this?
2.2 Analysis
We use linear mixed effects modelling (an extension of linear regression) to deter-
mine the contribution of each of the hop attributes, as rated by experts, to overall
hop difficulty. We also assess the contribution of the associated uncertainty in
these ratings, captured through the interval-valued response-format. The mid-
point (m) of the interval-valued response is used as a single-valued numeric
rating of the attribute, and the width (w) of the response is used to represent
the uncertainty around this rating. Note, of course, that higher widths are only
possible towards the centre of the scale. That is, as the midpoint approaches
the edge of the scale, a wide interval cannot exist. Also, note that while experts
provided ratings in the range [0, 100], these data were standardised, through
z-transformation, before entry into the model.
This approach estimates the contribution of each attribute’s midpoint and
width together upon the same outcome variable, in the form of β weights. These
variables are entered as fixed effects. The inclusion of random intercepts also
allows the model to account for potential between expert and between hop dif-
ferences in baseline ratings. In addition, this technique allows us to examine the
combined effects of attribute rating and uncertainty (e.g. high certainty may have
an opposite effect on overall difficulty when relating to a high or low attribute
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Table 2. Attributes used to describe evade hops, the question used in the study, and
the variable name used in the analysis.
var attribute description
c complexity How complex is the job of providing this kind of de-
fence?
a availability of infor-
mation
How likely is that there will be publicly available in-
formation that could help with evading defence?
r maturity How mature is this type of technology?
o overall difficulty Overall, how difficult would it be for an attacker to do
this?
rating). We model this through the inclusion of two-way interaction terms (m·w)
pertaining to the midpoint and width of each attribute.
Four separate analyses are reported. These were conducted for the dependent
variables of
– attack hop overall difficulty rating (interval midpoint)
– attack hop overall uncertainty (interval width)
– evade hop overall difficulty rating (interval midpoint)
– evade hop overall uncertainty (interval width)
For each of these analyses, an initial model was created. These included fixed
effects of all hop attribute ratings, all hop attribute widths and all two-way
interactions, along with random intercepts for both expert and hop. Following
this, a stepwise variable reduction process was applied to each model, in order to
remove variables that were found not to significantly contribute to the respective
outcome variable. β weights of the variables retained into the final models were
then interpreted as estimates of the (significant) contribution of each of these
factors to the respective outcome variable.
Table 1 lists the variables used to denote the attributes of attack hops. The
sum of all simple effects for the attack hop attribute midpoints (ratings) is
Azm = β
z
1x
cm
i,j + β
z
2x
tm
i,j + β
z
3x
fm
i,j + β
z
4x
am
i,j + β
z
5x
dm
i,j + β
z
6x
rm
i,j + β
z
7x
gm
i,j (1)
where β is the coefficient, xcmi,j is the value m (midpoint) of attribute c (com-
plexity) for i (a given expert) and j (a given hop), and z reflects the model’s
outcome variable, which may be either m (midpoints) or w (widths) of the overall
difficulty.
The sum of all simple effects for the attack hop attribute widths (uncertainty)
is
Azw = β
z
8x
cw
i,j + β
z
9x
tw
i,j + β
z
10x
fw
i,j + β
z
11x
aw
i,j + β
z
12x
dw
i,j + β
z
13x
rw
i,j + β
z
14x
gw
i,j (2)
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where xcwi,j is the width w of attribute c (complexity) for i (a given expert) and
j (a given hop).
The sum of the interactions between the midpoints and widths of the attack
hop attributes is
Azmw =β
z
15(x
cm
i,j · xcwi,j ) + βz16(xtmi,j · xtwi,j) + βz17(xfmi,j · xfwi,j ) + βz18(xami,j · xawi,j )+
βz19(x
dm
i,j · xdwi,j ) + βz20(xrmi,j · xrwi,j ) + βz21(xgmi,j · xgwi,j ) (3)
Our initial model formula to explain the overall difficulty rating midpoints
(γAomi,j ) and widths (γ
Aow
i,j ) of attack hops is then
γAozi,j = β
z
0 +A
z
m +A
z
w +A
z
mw + µ
z
i + µ
z
j + 
z
i,j (4)
where z reflects the model’s outcome variable, which may be either m (mid-
points) or w (widths), for expert i on hop j; β0 denotes the fixed intercept; µi
and µj denote respective random intercepts for expert and hop; and  repre-
sents the error. The remaining β terms (within Am, Aw and Amw) denote the
coefficients of the fixed effects of the hop attributes.
We perform likewise calculations for the evade hops (variables listed in Table
2). The sum of effects for the midpoints of the evade hops is
Ezm = β
z
1x
cm
i,j + β
z
2x
am
i,j + β
z
3x
rm
i,j , (5)
for the widths is
Ezw = β
z
4x
cw
i,j + β
z
5x
aw
i,j + β
z
6x
rw
i,j , (6)
and for the interactions is
Ezmw = β
z
7(x
cm
i,j · xcwi,j ) + βz8(xami,j · xawi,j ) + βz9(xrmi,j · xrwi,j ) (7)
Our initial model formula to explain the overall difficulty ratings for midpoints
(γEomi,j ) and widths (γ
Eow
i,j ) of evade hops is then
γEozi,j = β
z
0 + E
z
m + E
z
w + E
z
mw + µ
z
i + µ
z
j + 
z
i,j . (8)
Each of the initial models, as presented above, was then subjected to a back-
wards stepwise variable elimination procedure. During this, fixed effects were
iteratively assessed and those that did not significantly contribute to the overall
model were removed. Specifically, this process began by selection, from the pool
of all non-significant fixed effects, of the effect with the t-statistic closest to zero.
This variable was then removed, and the resulting model directly compared with
the preceding one, using the Theoretical Likelihood Ratio test. This was imple-
mented through the MATLAB fitlme and compare functions. If the benefit of
retaining the variable in question was calculated to be non-significant, then the
model with the lower Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was retained into
the next iteration. This procedure continued until a final model was determined,
within which all fixed effects were statistically significant.
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3 Results
3.1 Attack Hops
Table 3 shows all effects retained in the final model with the outcome variable of
overall attack hop difficulty (midpoints), following the stepwise variable reduc-
tion process. These results indicate that a number of factors make a substantial
contribution. Attacks were rated less difficult if they are frequently reported or
have a large availability of tools. By contrast, attacks were rated as more difficult
if they have a greater inherent difficulty or relate to more mature technologies.
Attacks were also rated as more difficult when technological maturity was un-
certain and, perhaps surprisingly, when easier to go unnoticed. The latter might
relate to some underlying factor - for instance, some attacks may be difficult
to conduct, but also difficult to detect. The significant interaction term (m · w)
indicates a combined effect of reported tool availability and uncertainty around
this. This likely reflects that a hop is rated as being more difficult to attack when
experts are certain about availability being low, but less difficult when experts
are certain about availability being high. Unsurprisingly, the inherent difficulty
rating was found to have the most robust effect.
Table 3. Results showing significant effects of hop attribute midpoints (m), widths (w)
and two-way interactions (m ·w) on midpoints of overall attack hop difficulty ratings.
Fixed Effects Estimates β SE t p
Intercept : (0) .012 .066 .175 .861
Frequency m : (xfmi,j ) -.223 .044 -5.065 < .001
Availability Tool m : (xami,j ) -.201 .044 -4.574 < .001
Inherent Difficulty m : (xdmi,j ) .357 .030 11.890 < .001
Maturity m : (xrmi,j ) .126 .030 4.159 < .001
Going Unnoticed. m : (xgmi,j ) .142 .027 5.194 < .001
Maturity w : (xrwi,j ) .071 .027 2.612 .009
Availability Tool m · w : (xami,j · xawi,j ) .077 .036 2.168 .031
Random Effects Estimates µ
Expert intercept (i) .183
Hop intercept (j) .204
Residual i,j .502
N = 532, DF = 524, AIC = 896.7, BIC=943.6
Table 4 shows all effects retained in the final model with the outcome variable
of uncertainty surrounding overall attack hop difficulty (widths). Even more fac-
tors were retained in this final model. Results indicated that experts were more
certain about the vulnerability of hops on which attacks were reported more fre-
quently - likely due to familiarity. They were also more certain regarding hops
that relate to mature technologies or when tool availability is low. By contrast,
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Table 4. Results showing significant effects of hop attribute midpoints (m), widths
(w) and two-way interactions (m ·w) on widths of overall attack hop difficulty ratings.
Fixed Effects Estimates β SE t p
Intercept : (0) -.031 .036 -.857 .392
Frequency m : (xfmi,j ) -.116 .045 -2.614 .009
Availability Tool m : (xami,j ) .131 .045 2.934 .003
Maturity m : (xrmi,j ) -.093 .031 -3.013 .003
Frequency w : (xfwi,j ) .141 .035 4.034 < .001
Availability Tool w : (xawi,j ) .095 .039 2.420 .016
Inherent Difficulty w : (xdwi,j ) .406 .037 10.959 < .001
Going Unnoticed w : (xgwi,j ) .268 .036 7.399 < .001
Maturity m · w : (xrmi,j · xrwi,j ) -.122 .035 -3.484 < .001
Going Unnoticed m · w : (xgmi,j · xgwi,j ) -.080 .035 -2.270 .024
Random Effects Estimates µ
Expert intercept (i) .127
Hop intercept (j) .000
Residual i,j .609
N = 532, DF = 522, AIC = 1066.3, BIC=1121.7
overall uncertainty significantly increased in line with attribute uncertainty for
reported attack frequency, tool availability, inherent difficulty, and ease of going
unnoticed. Two interaction terms were also retained, indicating that the effects
of uncertainty around these attributes on overall uncertainty were significantly
modulated by attribute rating, or vice versa. These can be interpreted together
with main effects, depending upon direction. For example, in the case of ease of
going unnoticed, there is a relatively large positive main effect of attribute un-
certainty and a smaller, but significant, negative interaction term. This indicates
that overall ratings were most uncertain when going unnoticed was considered
difficult but uncertain. However, overall ratings were most certain when going
unnoticed was considered difficult with certainty. The effect of attribute un-
certainty was reduced, though still substantial, around hops rated as easier to
go unnoticed when attacking. For maturity, however, there is a negative main
effect of attribute rating and a negative interaction term, of comparable size.
This indicates that overall uncertainty was greatest when maturity was rated
low but uncertain. Also, while an increase in maturity rating tended to increase
the certainty of overall ratings, this effect was driven by cases in which maturity
was itself uncertain. Of all effects in this analysis, uncertainty surrounding the
inherent difficulty rating was found to be the most robust.
3.2 Evade Hops
Table 5 shows all effects retained in the final model with the outcome variable of
overall evade hop difficulty (midpoints). Four fixed effects were retained. Experts
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Table 5. Results showing significant effects of hop attribute midpoints (m), widths (w)
and two-way interactions (m · w) on midpoints of overall evade hop difficulty ratings.
Fixed Effects Estimates β SE t p
Intercept : (0) -.023 .133 -.173 .863
Availability Information m : (xami,j ) -.240 .049 -4.895 < .001
Maturity m : (xrmi,j ) .177 .051 3.459 < .001
Availability Information w : (xawi,j ) .142 .049 2.878 .004
Complexity m · w : (xcmi,j · xcwi,j ) -.105 .053 -1.993 .047
Random Effects Estimates µ
Expert intercept (i) .457
Hop intercept (j) .340
Residual i,j .772
N = 418, DF = 413, AIC = 1081.8, BIC=1114.0
Table 6. Results showing significant effects of hop attribute midpoints (m), widths
(w) and two-way interactions (m ·w) on widths of overall evade hop difficulty ratings.
Fixed Effects Estimates β SE t p
Intercept : (0) -.000 .058 -.000 > .999
Complexity w : (xcwi,j ) .241 .046 5.200 < .001
Availability Information w : (xawi,j ) .440 .045 9.683 < .001
Maturity w : (xrwi,j ) .134 .045 2.982 .003
Random Effects Estimates µ
Expert intercept (i) .070
Hop intercept (j) .159
Residual i,j .643
N = 418, DF = 414, AIC = 863.0, BIC=891.2
rated a hop as less difficult to evade when more information is available to
aid with this, but more difficult to evade when they were uncertain about the
availability of such information. Overall evasion difficulty was also higher for hops
relating to more mature technologies. A negative interaction term was evident
for ratings of hop complexity, with certainty around a more complex hop being
associated with it being more difficult to evade, but certainty around a hop
being less complex associated with it being easier to evade. The availability of
information was found to be have the most robust effect.
Table 6 shows all effects retained in the final model with the outcome variable
of uncertainty surrounding overall evade hop difficulty (widths). These results
show that experts were more uncertain in their overall hop rating when they
were more uncertain about each of the three attributes of a given hop: complex-
ity, information availability, or maturity. However, no significant main effects
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of attribute rating position, nor any interaction terms were found. Uncertainty
surrounding information availability was found to have the most robust effect.
4 Conclusions
We analyse ratings provided by cyber-security experts that pertain to a range
of potentially important component (hop) attributes, previously identified as
commonly occurring within attack vectors of mainstream government cyber-
systems. Importantly, these ratings were obtained through interval-valued re-
sponses, which enable experts to indicate both their rating and the uncertainty
associated with this rating in a single, integrated response.
Our analyses provide a ‘proof of concept’ for interval-valued data capture
applied to the field of cyber-security. We identify key factors that contribute
to both component vulnerability and uncertainty, depending on whether a hop
requires compromising or only bypassing. For example, the availability of infor-
mation has the largest impact on the overall difficulty of evading a component,
while uncertainty around the inherent difficulty of an attack has the largest
impact on its overall uncertainty.
Uncertainty in experts’ attribute ratings is found to be valuable in determin-
ing not only overall uncertainty, but also overall hop vulnerability. In a number
of specific cases, this information explained variance over and above the discrete
midpoints of attribute ratings. For instance, when predicting the overall diffi-
culty of attack hops, uncertainty around the maturity of technology of a given
hop was associated with a significant increase in difficulty rating for that hop.
In other cases, we found that in order to best explain overall difficulty ratings it
was necessary to consider an interaction effect, between the position and width
of responses. Sometimes, the combination of both factors provided a better pre-
dictor than either did alone. It was the novel use of an interval-valued response
format that made it possible to coherently capture this uncertainty, alongside
traditional ratings.
This study provides initial empirical evidence for the potential added-value
offered by capturing interval-valued responses to model expert uncertainty. This
is demonstrated in the case of modelling vulnerabilities within cyber-systems
comprising multiple components, each with varying attributes, as is characteris-
tic of cyber-physical systems. The benefit of using interval-valued responses was
found using a comparatively low-complexity linear modelling approach. While
such an approach is unsuited to capturing varying effects of responses along the
response scale (for instance, it cannot account for a tendency for responses to
saturate towards the extremities), its simplicity facilitates interpretation of the
results. In future work, we will investigate the use of generalised additive mod-
els, within which the relationships between independent and dependent variables
may be non-linear. Additionally, we are pursuing an ongoing programme of re-
search to demonstrate the efficacy of interval-valued responses, both in terms of
capturing uncertainty and improving predictive power, with reference to real-
world ground-truth.
12 Z. Ellerby et al.
References
1. Aven, T., Renn, O.: On risk defined as an event where the outcome is uncertain.
Journal of risk research 12(1), 1–11 (2009)
2. Black, P.E., Scarfone, K., Souppaya, M.: Cyber security metrics and measures.
Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security pp. 1–15 (2008)
3. CESG: Extract from HMG IA Standard No.1 Business Impact Level Tables. CESG
(2009)
4. Choi, H.H., Cho, H.N., Seo, J.W.: Risk assessment methodology for under-
ground construction projects. Journal of Construction Engineering and Manage-
ment 130(2), 258–272 (2004)
5. Duan, Y., Cai, Y., Wang, Z., Deng, X.: A novel network security risk assess-
ment approach by combining subjective and objective weights under uncertainty.
Applied Sciences 8(3) (2018). https://doi.org/10.3390/app8030428, http://www.
mdpi.com/2076-3417/8/3/428
6. Feng, N., Li, M.: An information systems security risk assessment model under
uncertain environment. Applied Soft Computing 11(7), 4332–4340 (2011)
7. Fielder, A., Konig, S., Panaousis, E., Schauer, S., Rass, S.: Uncertainty in cyber
security investments. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.05893 (2017)
8. FIRST: Cvss v3.0 specification document, https://www.first.org/cvss/
specification-document
9. Gao, H., Zhu, J., Li, C.: The analysis of uncertainty of network security risk as-
sessment using dempster-shafer theory. In: 2008 12th International Conference on
Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design. pp. 754–759. IEEE (2008)
10. Gardner, D.: Risk: The science and politics of fear. Random House (2009)
11. Hubbard, D.W., Seiersen, R.: How to measure anything in cybersecurity risk. John
Wiley & Sons (2016)
12. Kahneman, D., Slovic, S.P., Slovic, P., Tversky, A.: Judgment under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. Cambridge university press (1982)
13. Koubatis, A., Schonberger, J.Y.: Risk management of complex critical systems.
International journal of critical infrastructures 1(2-3), 195–215 (2005)
14. Linda, O., Manic, M., Vollmer, T., Wright, J.: Fuzzy logic based anomaly detec-
tion for embedded network security cyber sensor. In: 2011 IEEE Symposium on
Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security (CICS). pp. 202–209. IEEE (2011)
15. Mell, P., Scarfone, K., Romanosky, S.: A complete guide to the common vulnerabil-
ity scoring system version 2.0. In: Published by FIRST-Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams. vol. 1, p. 23 (2007)
16. Miller, S., Appleby, S., Garibaldi, J.M., Aickelin, U.: Towards a more systematic
approach to secure systems design and analysis. International Journal of Secure
Software Engineering (IJSSE) 4(1), 11–30 (2013)
17. Miller, S., Wagner, C., Aickelin, U., Garibaldi, J.M.: Modelling cyber-security ex-
perts’ decision making processes using aggregation operators. computers & security
62, 229–245 (2016)
18. Munir, R., Disso, J.P., Awan, I., Mufti, M.R.: A quantitative measure of the se-
curity risk level of enterprise networks. In: 2013 Eighth International Conference
on Broadband and Wireless Computing, Communication and Applications. pp.
437–442. IEEE (2013)
19. Sikos, L.F.: Handling uncertainty and vagueness in network knowledge representa-
tion for cyberthreat intelligence. In: 2018 IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy
Systems (FUZZ-IEEE). pp. 1–6. IEEE (2018)
20. Slovic, P.: The perception of risk. Routledge (2016)
